Iran and the Bomb - Part II

I submitted a post on Iran and nuclear deterrents on March 25th (see link).  In that post I considered MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) as a deterrent for the US and Israel.  I admitted that I could not perceive the threat as an Israeli since I was not one of them but advocated that the world could accept a nuclear Iran.  Implicit in the entire post, however, was a worldview as a United States citizen, not a citizen of Israel.  Truly, I did not know how to face that position and to adequately express it.  A recent article in "Foreign Affairs" by Dmitri Adamsky attempts to provide that viewpoint.  Unfortunately, the author does not seem to be Israeli, putting him at a similar disadvantage as me, but he attempts to provide an Israeli POV (Point of View).  As a professor at an Israeli institution, he, better than me, can express a rational Israeli POV.

Dr. Adamsky outlines the post-nuclear strategy of the Israelis as two-pronged.  The initial strategy, circa 1967 when they apparently attained nuclear capability, was one of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), the "Samson Strategy".  The Samson strategy would employ nuclear weapons to preserve the state of Israel in a doomsday situation or destroy the destroyers of Israel.  Much like the nuclear deterrent options of the US, the Samson Strategy would employ nuclear devices if the existence of the Israeli state was threatened.  The US cold war strategy would have deployed tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional force overrun by the Soviet Union, not just a nuclear attack by that country, and the Samson Option would deploy nuclear weapons if the state of Israel was overwhelmed by conventional forces.

In 1981, more than 30 years ago in 1981, Menachem Begin attacked the Iraqi nuclear facilities and established what Dr. Adamsky calls the "Begin Doctrine".  He suggests that the Begin Doctrine is in conflict with the Samson option or MAD and that Israel wishes to cling to an asymmetrical deterrent of nuclear plus superior conventional force.

While I believe that Israel could rely on MAD, my view is akin to being willing to fight to the last Israeli.  That is, I have no skin in the game.  If Iran were to destroy Israel, my stocks would take a hit but it is likely that my life would go on roughly unaffected.  Contrast that with the life of the average Israeli and you might be able to understand the fear that a nuclear Iran presents to the Israelis.  Combine that with the age of the Israeli technology (1967) and you might be able to understand that Israel views a nuclear Iran differently than we do.

Dr. Adamsky, as an Israeli citizen, expresses a view more akin to my own.  That is, according to him, Israel might be able to countenance a nuclear Iran.  Read the article (again, the article is here) and decide for yourself.

I think that he supports his article well and the only weakness is that he does not address the age of the Isreali technology.